Essays in International Economics by Blengini, Isabella
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/2159
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2011
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Essays in International Economics
Author: Isabella Blengini
Boston College
The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Department of Economics
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
a dissertation
by
ISABELLA BLENGINI
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
August, 2011
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!!!
© copyright by ISABELLA BLENGINI 2011!
Contents
1 Portfolio Choice and Flight to Safety 2
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 A Look at the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 Technology and Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.3 The Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.4 Financial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.5 Market Clearing Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.6 Uncertainty Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.7 Optimality Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Model Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5 Portfolio Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.6 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.6.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.6.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
i
A 26
A.0.1 Steady-State Portfolio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B 29
B.0.2 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B.0.3 Stochastic Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
B.0.4 Market Clearing Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B.0.5 Optimality Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B.0.6 Portfolio Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
B.1 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2 Foreign Currency Debt and Expectations 50
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2.1 International Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2.2 Domestic Borrowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2.3 The Central Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2.4 Equilibrium Share of Peso Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3 The Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3.1 The Coordination Game among the Domestic Borrowers . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3.2 Simple Game between Two Large Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
C 75
D 78
ii
List of Figures
B.1 Nominal Exchange Rate. Source: Federal Reserve Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B.2 Yields on 3-month Treasury Securities. Source: Federal Reserve Board . . . . . . . 37
B.3 Foreign holdings of U.S. assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Source: U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.4 Foreign oﬃcial and private holdings of U.S. assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Source:
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B.5 Foreign oﬃcial and private holdings of U.S.Treasuries in millions of U.S. dollars.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B.6 U.S. holdings of foreign assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Source: U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B.7 U.S. holdings of short-term foreign bonds, in millions of U.S. dollars. Source: U.S.
Department of the Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
B.8 Foreign holdings of U.S. equities and Treasuries, as shares of U.S. GDP. Source: U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
B.9 Home holdings of Foreign equity when productivity shock volatility increases. . . . . 43
B.10 Home holdings of Foreign bonds when productivity shock volatility increases. . . . . 44
B.11 Home holdings of Foreign equity when government spending shock volatility increases. 45
B.12 Home holdings of Foreign bonds when government spending shock volatility increases. 46
iii
B.13 Home holdings of Foreign equity when preference shock volatility increases. . . . . . 47
B.14 Home holdings of Foreign bonds when preference shock volatility increases. . . . . . 48
iv
List of Tables
B.1 Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
v
Abstract
Dissertation Committee:
Professor FABIO GHIRONI (Chair)
Professor JAMES ANDERSON
Professor PETER IRELAND
This thesis includes two essays that analyze some features of the past financial crises. In the
first chapter I study the possible reasons why investors reduced their holdings of foreign equities,
and, at the same time, they increased their holdings of short-term government bonds, during the
2007 financial crisis that first hit the U.S. economy and soon became a world crisis. More precisely I
analyze how the increases in uncertainty during the crisis aﬀected capital flows. I use a two country
DSGE model and I assume that there is trade in both goods and financial assets. I assume that
each country is allowed to issue equities and government bonds, and I assume that each economy is
hit by three types of shocks: Preference, productivity and government spending shocks. I proxy the
increase in uncertainty with the introduction of uncertainty shocks, i.e. I allow the variances of the
shocks to be time-varying. My findings show that uncertainty is a source of portfolio-dynamics that
can contribute to explain, together with the other sources already identified in the literature, devia-
tions of the portfolio from its steady-state. Investors choose their portfolio with the goal to smooth
consumption. Therefore they want to hold assets with returns that display a negative covariance
with consumption. When uncertainty shocks hit, the way in which the real variables of the model
covary with asset returns changes. As a consequence, agents need to re-adjust their portfolios until
when the shock has disappeared. I also show under which conditions it is rational for investors to
increase their holdings of foreign government bonds and, at the same time, reduce their holdings of
foreign equity, in response to an increase in global uncertainty. My findings show that the response
of the portfolio to an increase in uncertainty crucially depends on the source of uncertainty. If un-
certainty comes from aggregate demand, it is optimal for agents to increase their holdings of foreign
bonds and reduce their holdings of foreign equity. If instead the source of uncertainty is aggregate
supply, agents find it optimal to increase their holdings of foreign equity and reduce their holdings
of foreign bonds. This finding suggests that the movements of capital that took place during the
crisis are compatible with an increase in uncertainty coming from aggregate demand. This result
is supported by those theories that identify the collapse in demand as the main cause of the slump
experienced by the U.S. and by many other economies during the crisis.
In the second chapter I study the currency denomination of the debt in emerging countries. Empir-
ical studies have shown that emerging countries are often characterized by the presence of a high
share of foreign currency denominated debt. As the debt crises of the 1990s show, the presence
of foreign currency debt can be risky because, beyond creating a mismatch in the domestic firms
balance sheets, it also constraints the traditional domestic policy instruments in dealing with home
and foreign economic shocks. The reasons why such risky forms of international finance arise in the
first place remain an open question. If foreign debt is so dangerous-as it is-it may be worth trying
to give a micro-foundation to its emergence. Such a high share of foreign currency debt should be
at least in part justified by the presence of some private benefits for the agents that choose this
form of finance. The goal of this chapter is to rationalize the choice to borrow in dollars rather than
in domestic currency on the international markets. In order to do so, I study how informational
asymmetries and heterogeneous expectations can aﬀect the choice of a borrower to expose herself to
a currency risk. Furthermore I look at the policy implications of my findings to understand which
policies could reduce the incentive of agents to dollarize. My model is a portfolio choice model
with asymmetric information that analyzes how agents choose the currency denomination of their
debt. The main findings of my model show that when domestic agents have a high informational
advantage and/or there is a low level of transparency on international markets, an increase in the
degree of dollarization might be observed, if the fundamentals are relatively strong. Alternatively,
if there is endogeneity between the exchange rate policy implemented by the monetary authority
and domestic agents decisions, a certain degree of complementarity in borrowers choices may arise,
thus creating a phenomenon of moral hazard. If domestic agents know that a high share of dollar
debt in the economy makes the exchange rate more rigid, they may want to coordinate on the
equilibrium where all the corporate debt in the economy is denominated in the same currency, even
when the fundamentals of the economy are relatively weak. These results have interesting policy
implications. A benevolent central bank that strongly bases her policy on the degree of dollarization
in the economy, can generate a coordination mechanism among the domestic borrowers that results
in a risky degree of dollarization. The solution would be to ex-ante choose a central banker with
a strong preference for a flexible exchange rate. My findings also show the importance of trans-
parency. Transparency does not necessarily coincide with public information. My model actually
shows that the precision of private sources of information determines the degree of dollarization.
If international markets could have access to some sources of private information, they would be
more willing to lend in pesos, when the fundamentals are relatively strong. As a consequence the
economy would not experience high levels of dollarization and would be better protected against
future negative shocks.
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Chapter 1
Portfolio Choice and Flight to Safety
1.1 Introduction
The features of the financial crisis that started in the U.S. in August 2007 and soon spread to the
rest of the world, have been extensively analyzed. Economists have found analogies between the
current crisis and diﬀerent crises that occurred in the past. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008a, 2008b)
empirically document how several variables have behaved similarly during past financial crises and
this one. Eichengreen (2008) also emphasizes how this crisis does not diﬀer from the 1997-98 Asian
crises, which were also characterized by lack of transparency, lax bank regulation, and connected
lending that allowed some large institutions to enjoy privileged access to borrowed funds.
However, this episode diﬀers from the previous ones because the largest economy in the world was
at the epicenter of the crisis. The U.S. financial crisis soon became a world crisis and the panic
spread across economies. As a result, in this occasion, capital did not massively flow out of the
crisis country generating the “sudden stops” and “capital reversals” that have instead characterized
previous episodes of turmoil. Foreign investors reduced their holdings of U.S. equities indeed, but,
at the same time, they increased their holdings of U.S. Treasuries, to such an extent that the U.S.
2
dollar started appreciating, and the yields on U.S. Treasury bills reached historical lows (Figures 1
and 2). The sudden change in the direction of the diﬀerent types of capital, including Treasuries,
U.S. and foreign corporate stocks and bonds, has been followed by a stabilization and a return to
previous trends in 2009.
The decision of private markets to invest so heavily in the country from which the crisis originated
has been explained 1 as a flight to safety. The behavior of investors has been described as the result
of “the insatiable need to accumulate safe debt instruments”2. As international investors realized
that U.S. corporate assets could not satisfy their demand, they decided to run to U.S. Treasuries.
The reallocation of funds took place across asset classes, rather than across countries. But, what did
U.S. investors do during the crisis? They dramatically reduced their holdings of foreign equity and,
in some countries, they increased their holdings of short-term bonds. So, the question is: Under
which conditions are foreign bonds a better hedging instrument than foreign equity? The goal of
this paper is to identify the factors that can rationally justify the choice of agents to increase their
holdings in foreign bonds and run away from foreign equity, when there is an increase in world
uncertainty.
Earlier literature often abstracts from endogenous portfolio choices because of technical diﬃculties.
The standard approach to solve DSGE models in fact relies on first-order approximations around
the steady state that prove inadequate to capture second moments that determine portfolio choices.
In a stochastic world, financial assets are diﬀerentiated by their degree of risk, and optimal portfolio
choices are determined by correlations and variances of stochastic variables.
This paper makes use of the solution method recently developed by Devereux and Sutherland
(2006). Their novel procedure consists in the combination of second-order approximations of the
portfolio equations of the model with first-order approximations of non-portfolio equations. This
1Caballero (2009), DeLong (2010) and Cochrane (2010), among many others.
2Caballero (2009).
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allows to determine how the stochastic structure of the model aﬀects the portfolio allocation and
it becomes possible to characterize economy’s first-order response to stochastic shocks under the
optimal portfolio. First-order dynamics of steady-state portfolio can be obtained by combining a
third-order approximation of the portfolio equation and a second-order approximation of the rest
of the model. Time variations in portfolios become relevant for macroeconomic dynamics at the
second level of approximation.
The contribution of the paper is twofold: First, I show that uncertainty is a source of portfolio-
dynamics that can contribute to explain, together with the other sources already identified in the
literature, deviations of the portfolio from its steady-state.
Second, I show under which conditions it is rational for investors to increase their holdings of foreign
government bonds and, at the same time, reduce their holdings of foreign equity, in response to an
increase in global uncertainty. I use a two country DSGE model and I assume that there is trade in
both goods and financial assets. Each country specializes in the production of one good, and trade
is justified by the features of final consumption that is a bundle of domestic and foreign goods.
The international asset portfolio includes two types of securities: stocks and bonds. Each country
issues one government bond and one equity, denominated in local goods. There are three sources of
shocks: one preference shock, productivity shocks and public spending shocks. Furthermore I proxy
the increase in uncertainty with the introduction of uncertainty shocks, i.e. I allow the variances
of the shocks to be time-varying. The number of shocks is larger than the number of assets and
therefore the international financial markets are incomplete.
Investors choose their portfolio with the goal to smooth consumption. Therefore they want to hold
assets with returns that display a negative covariance with consumption. The resulting steady-state
portfolio features home bias in both bond and stock holdings. When uncertainty shocks hit, the
way in which real variables covary with asset returns changes. As a consequence, agents need to
re-adjust their portfolios until when the shock has disappeared.
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My main findings are that the response of the portfolio to an increase in uncertainty crucially
depends on the source of uncertainty. If uncertainty comes from aggregate demand, it is optimal
for agents to increase their holdings of foreign bonds and reduce their holdings of foreign equity.
If instead the source of uncertainty is aggregate supply, agents find it optimal to increase their
holdings of foreign equity and reduce their holdings of foreign bonds.
This finding seems to suggest that the movements of capital that took place during the crisis are
compatible with an increase in uncertainty coming from aggregate demand. This result is supported
by those theories that identify the collapse in demand as the main cause of the slump experienced
by the U.S. and by many other economies during the crisis3. On the one hand, the explosion of the
housing bubble and the dramatic reduction in consumer spending in housing and durables can be
described as an increase in the volatility of consumers’ preferences. On the other hand, the inability
of governments to realize eﬀective fiscal policies during the crisis can be considered a big source of
uncertainty that did not help the recovery and that might have aﬀected investors’ portfolio choice.
The model is also able to give reason of other episodes of capital movements observed in the past: A
combination of aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks is also able to replicate the massive
capital outflows from the crisis country that have been observed in the late 90’s.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a more detailed description of capital
movements during the crisis. Section 3 presents the model set-up. In section 4 I briefly show the
solution method, calibrate the model and discuss the results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 A Look at the Crisis
In this section I show some more details on the movement of capital that took place at the beginning
of the crisis. As already mentioned in the introduction, 2007 can be considered a turning point:
3Hall, (2011).
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After 2007 foreign holdings of U.S. equities registered a dramatic reduction, while foreign holdings of
U.S. Treasury bonds increased. The purpose of the model is to describe private agents’ investment
decisions. It is well known that a large component of foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds is
represented by oﬃcial holdings. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show that private and oﬃcial investors’ holdings
of Treasuries followed diﬀerent paths after the panic: Private investors increased their holdings of
U.S. Treasuries after 2007, but after 2008 they started reducing them. Oﬃcial investors, instead,
went on investing in U.S. Treasury bonds. Furthermore, it has been documented (Warnock, 2010)
that private agents mainly hold short-term U.S.Treasuries, while governments mainly invest in
long-term U.S. Treasuries. Private holdings of short-term Treasuries could have been considered a
hedge against the risk, and, when the panic was over, things went back to normality and investors
gradually started increasing U.S.equity holdings.
But what happened to U.S. holdings of foreign assets? As Figure (6) shows, there was a strong
reduction in equity holdings and a mild reduction in bond holdings, while foreign direct investment
kept increasing. But if we carefully look at U.S. holdings of foreign bonds, we can observe a
diﬀerence in the behavior of short and long-term bond holdings. Figure 7 shows a classification of
the countries that experienced an increase in U.S. holdings of their short-term debt, in millions of
U.S. dollars.
In some cases, U.S. investors reduced their holdings of both long-term and short-term bonds, but, in
some other cases, they only reduced their holdings of long-term foreign bonds, while they increased
their holdings of short-term foreign bonds. For example, U.K., Ireland and Greece, registered a
reduction in the U.S. holdings of their debt. However in the case of other countries, like Germany,
Canada or Norway, there was a reduction in U.S. holdings of long-term debt, but, at the same
time, an increase in U.S. holdings of short-term debt. The only exception is Switzerland that
instead registered an increase in U.S. holdings of long-term debt and a reduction in U.S. holdings
of short-term debt. Also developing countries like Brazil and Thailand registered an increase in
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U.S. holdings of their short-term debt. Some developing countries had in fact been implementing
rigorous fiscal and monetary policies in order to recover from their own crises. When the crisis
hit the U.S., they were therefore characterized by relatively strong fundamentals that might have
increased the attractiveness of their assets.
The choice of U.S. and foreign investors to increase their holdings of foreign short-term debt might
be important in the description of the dynamics of capital flows during the crisis. There could
have been an important symmetry in the behavior of investors during the crisis: As uncertainty
increased, both U.S. and foreign investors used foreign short-term debt to protect themselves. This
justifies my choice to use a two-country symmetric model in the rest of the paper4.
In what follows I assume that one country is the U.S. and the other one is the rest of the world.
1.3 The Model
This is an infinite horizon, two-country open economy model. There are two ex-ante symmetric
countries,“Home” (H) and “Foreign” (F), each one populated by a representative household who
consumes, works and trades a portfolio of financial assets. Each country specializes in the produc-
tion of one good and issues stocks and government bonds, which are traded internationally. The
international portfolio therefore consists of four assets: two equities and two government bonds. I
allow for three types of shocks in each country: preference shocks, total factor productivity shocks,
and government shocks. The number of shocks is larger than the number of assets available: This
implies that financial markets are incomplete.
4In this version of the model I assume that the two countries have the same size. Size eﬀects could be important
in quantitatively determining steady-state portfolios, but they should not aﬀect the qualitative predictions of the
symmetric model, as shown in Ghironi et al. (2009).
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1.3.1 Preferences
The household in country i = H,F chooses consumption C i and labor li to maximize the intertem-
poral utility function:
maxEt
∞￿
s=0
βs(
(C it+s)
1−σ
1− σ − χ
(lit+s)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
) (1.1)
with coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ > 0 and a Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/ϕ. The
Home final consumption basket combines home and foreign goods:
CHt = [κ
1/θ
t (c
HH
t )
(θ−1)/θ + (1− κt)1/θ(cFHt )(θ−1)/θ]θ/(θ−1) (1.2)
where cij is the amount of consumption good produced by country i and consumed by country j.
κ is a time varying preference parameter equal to κt = κ exp(vt), where vt is the preference shock
that follows an AR(1) process: vt = φvvt−1 + εvt
5. The parameter κ ∈ (0, 1) measures the share of
local spending in consumption. If κ > 0.5, the agent is said to have a “home bias” preference in
consumption.
Similarly, the consumption bundle for the foreign country depends on home and foreign goods, and
the foreign preference parameter is κ∗t = κ exp(−vt). The Foreign consumption basket is:
CFt = [(κ
∗
t )
1/θ(cFFt )
(θ−1)/θ + (1− κ∗t )1/θ(cHFt )(θ−1)/θ]θ/(θ−1). (1.3)
A positive preference shock at the same time increases the consumption of the Home produced
good and reduces the consumption of the Foreign produced good in both countries. The aggregate
consumer price index for Home, PHt , is defined as:
PHt = [κt(p
H
t )
1−θ + (1− κt)(pFt )1−θ]
1
1−θ , (1.4)
5The introduction of preference shocks generates incomplete markets, since the number of assets is smaller then
the number of shocks. Furthermore the assumption of preference shocks during a crisis is not unrealistic: During a
crisis agents for example prefer to postpone purchases of some goods, like consumer durables, while there are some
other types of goods, like food, to which they cannot renounce.
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where pHt and p
F
t are the nominal prices of final home and foreign goods, denominated in the Home
currency. Similarly, Foreign price index in Home currency is defined as:
P Ft = [κ
∗
t (p
F
t )
1−θ + (1− κ∗t )(pHt )1−θ]
1
1−θ . (1.5)
In this economy the law of one price holds. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) does not hold, and
the real exchange rate is defined as the ratio between the Foreign price index over the Home price
index: Qt =
PFt
PHt
.
1.3.2 Technology and Firms
In period t, country i produces yit units of good i according to the production function
yit = A
i
tl
α
t
6, (1.6)
with i = H,F The stochastic productivity, Ait, is an exogenous random variable that follows an
AR(1) process:
Ait+1 = φ
AAit + ε
A
t+1. (1.7)
The Cobb-Douglas technology implies that a constant share of output α is paid to workers. There-
fore, the total cost of labor for country i is:
witl
i
t = αp
i
ty
i
t, (1.8)
where pit is the price if the good produced in country i at time t, and w
i
t is the wage rate of country
i at time t. Dividends of country i are defined as the share of output that is not paid to labor:
dit = (1− α)pityit. (1.9)
6In alternative, the assumption of a production function linear in labor and monopoly would have generated the
same results.
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1.3.3 The Government
The public sector of country i issues at time t government bonds Bit+1 denominated in the domestic
good. The real price of the bond at time t is zit and its return is one unit of good i at time t+1. The
government collects lump sum taxes T i in order to finance public spending. The budget constraint
of the government is:
zitB
i
t+1 =
pit
P it
Bit +
pit
P it
Git − T it , (1.10)
where public spending in country i, Gi, is assumed to fall entirely on the good produced by country
i. Public spending follows an AR(1) process:
Git+1 = φ
GGit + ε
G
t+1. (1.11)
1.3.4 Financial Markets
Each country i issues two types of assets: government bonds and stocks. There is a bond denomi-
nated in the Home good and one denominated in the Foreign good: Buying one unit of the Home
(Foreign) bond at time t delivers one unit of Home (Foreign) good in the following period. Each
country also issues a stock that represents a claim to country i firm’s streams of cash-flows, di. The
supply of each share is normalized to unity. Let Sijt+1denote the number of shares of stock i held
by country j household at the end of period t, while Bijt+1 represents holdings of bonds issued by
country i and held by country j. The budget constraint for the home economy at time t is:
nfaHt+1 +
ϕ
2
(nfaHt+1)
2 = (Y Ht −GHt )
pHt
PHt
− CHt + γFt nfaHt + (γFt − γHt )qHt−1SHFt
+(RFt − γFt )zFt−1BHFt − (RHt − γFt )zHt−1BHHt , (1.12)
where nfaH are net foreign assets, and they are defined as:
nfaHt+1 = z
F
t B
FH
t+1 + q
F
t S
FH
t+1 − qHt SHFt+1 − zHt BHFt+1 . (1.13)
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γH and γF are the returns on stocks issued by Home and Foreign and defined in terms of Home
consumption:
γHt =
(PHt q
H
t + d
H
t )
PHt q
H
t−1
, (1.14)
and
γFt =
(PHt q
F
t + d
F
t )
PHt q
F
t−1
. (1.15)
RHt and R
F
t are the returns on Home and Foreign bonds in terms of Home consumption, and they
are defined as:
RHt =
pHt
PHt z
H
t−1
, (1.16)
and
RFt =
pFt
PHt z
F
t−1
. (1.17)
The term ϕ2 (nfa
H
t+1)
2 describes a convex cost of adjusting net foreign assets. It is a stationarity-
inducing device that allows to pin down a unique, deterministic steady-state level of net foreign
assets.
Foreign agents solve a similar portfolio allocation problem and their budget constraint is:
nfaFt+1 +
ϕ
2
(nfaFt+1)
2 = (Y Ft −GFt )
pFt
P Ft
− CFt + γHt nfaFt + (γHt − γFt )qFt−1SFHt
+(RHt − γHt )zHt−1BFHt − (RFt − γHt )zFt−1BFFt , (1.18)
where Foreign net foreign assets nfaFt+1, are defined as:
nfaFt+1 = z
H
t B
HF
t+1 + q
H
t S
HF
t+1 − qFt SFHt+1 − zFt BFHt+1 . (1.19)
1.3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
The resource constraints are
cHHt + c
HF
t +G
H
t = Y
H
t (1.20)
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and
cFFt + c
FH
t +G
F
t = Y
F
t (1.21)
If we define the value of Home equity held by the two countries in terms of Home consumption,
qHSHH and qHSHF , as aHHt and a
HF
t the market clearing condition for the asset issued by Home
economy is:
aHHt + a
HF
t = q
H
t , (1.22)
since the total number of equities is normalized to unity, SHHt + S
HF
t = 1. Similarly, by defining
holdings of Foreign equity in terms of Home consumption, the market clearing condition for Foreign
equity is:
aFFt + a
FH
t = q
F
t . (1.23)
In the case of bonds, we have:
BHt = b
HH
t + b
HF
t , (1.24)
BFt = b
FF
t + b
FH
t , (1.25)
where Bit is the total number of bonds issued by country i at time t.
1.3.6 Uncertainty Shocks
Recently there has been an increasing interest in the analysis of the eﬀects of uncertainty on macroe-
conomic variables7. Diﬀerently from the previous portfolio literature, I look at the eﬀect of uncer-
tainty shocks on the steady-state portfolio and on its dynamics. I introduce uncertainty through
the assumption that the variances of the shocks that hit the economy are time-varying and can
7For example see Benigno et al.(2010), Bloom (2009), Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2009), Fernandez-
Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez and Uribe (2009).
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deviate from their steady-state value according to the following stochastic processes8:
σ2At+1 = ρ
Aσ2A + (1− ρA)σ2Yt + ηAuAt+1, (1.26)
σ2Gt+1 = ρ
Gσ2G + (1− ρG)σ2Gt + ηGuGt+1, (1.27)
σ2vt+1 = ρ
vσ2v + (1− ρv)σ2vt + ηvuvt+1, (1.28)
with uit+1 is identically and independently distributed process with mean zero and unitary variance.
σ2i are the steady state values of the variances, with i = A,G, v.
1.3.7 Optimality Conditions
The first-order conditions for country i with respect to equities, bonds and labor are:
C it
−σ
(1 + ϕSHit+1) = βEt(C
i−σ
t+1γ
H
t+1), (1.29)
C it
−σ
(1 + ϕSFit+1) = βEt(C
i−σ
t+1γ
F
t+1), (1.30)
C it
−σ
(1 + ϕBHit+1) = βEt(C
i−σ
t+1R
H
t+1), (1.31)
C it
−σ
(1 + ϕBFit+1) = βEt(C
i−σ
t+1R
F
t+1), (1.32)
χlit
φ
= C it
−σ
αAtl
α−1
t . (1.33)
1.4 Model Solution
It is well known that in open economy macro literature, the optimal portfolio is indeterminate.
Standard approximation methods that use only first-order approximations imply that certainty
equivalence holds, and, as a result, all assets are perfect substitutes. In order to overcome this
8As in Benigno et al. (2010), I assume that the exogenous state variables follow conditionally-linear stochastic
processes, where the variances of the primitive shocks follow stochastic linear processes.
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indeterminacy problem, Devereux and Sutherland (2006, 2010)9, provide a solution method that
allows to determine steady-state portfolios. Their solution method is characterized by a two part
solution: a second-order approximation of portfolio equations, in combination with a first-order
approximation of the rest of the model. In this way it is possible to determine how the stochastic
structure of the model aﬀects the portfolio allocation, and it is possible to characterize the econ-
omy’s first-order response to stochastic shocks under the optimal portfolio.
Equations (6), (12)-(17), (20), (29)-(33), along with their foreign equivalent, may be solved in order
to determine the path of quantities { CHt , CFt , lHt , lFt , yHt , yFt }, prices {wHt , wFt , qHt , qFt , zHt , zFt , T ott, Qt}
rates of returns{γHt , γFt , RHt , RFt }, and the vector of steady-state asset holdings {aHH , aHF , aFF , aFH ,
bHH , bHF , bFF , bFH}.
Following the procedure that is described in Appendix A, it is possible to find the steady-state value
of foreign equity holdings and foreign bond holdings:
aHF = f(σ2A, σ2G, σ2v, parameters), (1.34)
bHF = f(σ2A, σ2G, σ2v, parameters). (1.35)
Steady-state foreign equity and foreign bond holdings are a function of the parameters of the model
and of the steady-state variances of the shocks.
1.5 Portfolio Dynamics
DS (2006) show that a combination of third-order approximations of the portfolio equations and
second-order approximations of the rest of the model delivers the path followed by the portfolio,
when the economy is hit by a shock. DS (2006) showed that deviations of exogenous state variables
from their steady-state are a source of portfolio changes. My contribution is to point out that
9From now on DS (2006).
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uncertainty shocks can be an additional source of portfolio dynamics. Not only the shocks of the
model, but also their time-varying variances can contribute to explain deviations of the portfolio
from its steady-state.
Traditionally DSGE models rely on the assumption of homoscedastic shocks, but recently the atten-
tion has been focused on the eﬀects of time-varying variances on the business cycle. As in Benigno
et al. (2010) I rely on the assumption that the exogenous state variables follow a conditionally-linear
stochastic process in which the variance of the primitive shocks are modelled through a stochastic
linear process. As shown in Benigno et al. (2010), in the presence of uncertainty shocks the second-
order approximation of the model is suﬃcient to capture the eﬀects of uncertainty. It follows that
when this principle is applied to the portfolio problem, first-order portfolio dynamics can be then
generated by a combination of second and third-order approximations of the model.
The third-order approximations of the portfolio equations, as obtained in DS (2006), are:
Et[−σCˆDt+1γˆDt+1 +
σ2
2
(CˆD(2)t+1 γˆ
D
t+1)−
σ
2
(CˆDt+1γˆ
D(2)
t+1 )] = 0, (1.36)
and
Et[−σCˆDt+1RˆDt+1 +
σ2
2
(CˆD(2)t+1 Rˆ
D
t+1)−
σ
2
(CˆDt+1Rˆ
D(2)
t+1 )] = 0, (1.37)
where CˆD(2) is the second-order approximation of consumption and γˆD(2) and RˆD(2) are the second-
order approximations of the diﬀerence in the returns on equites and bonds. The second-order
approximation of the diﬀerential in consumption is:
CˆD(2)t = ηCDa ˆnfa
H
t + ηCDADAˆ
D
t + ηCDGDGˆ
D
t + ηCDξaγˆ
D
t +
ηCDaγD ˆnfatγˆ
D
t + ηCDAD(2)Aˆ
D(2)
t + ηCDGD(2)Gˆ
D(2)
t + ηCDξ(2) ξˆt ++ηCDθ(2) θˆt (1.38)
where ξˆt is now aˆtγˆDt and θˆt is now bˆtRˆ
D
t . The second-order approximation of equity and bond
return diﬀerential is instead:
γˆD(2)t = ηγεAε
A
t + ηγεGε
G
t + ηγεA(2)σ
2A
t + ηγεG(2)σ
2G
t (1.39)
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RˆD(2)t = ηRεAε
A
t + ηRεGε
G
t + ηRεA(2)σ
2A
t + ηRεG(2)σ
2G
t (1.40)
Plugging (38), (39) and (40) in the equilibrium conditions (36) and (37) you find the equations
that describe foreign holdings of Home assets dynamics, aˆt and bˆt.
In Appendix B I solve a simplified portfolio model that allows me to get an analytical solution
of the problem10. Time-varying volatilities are, together with state variables, a source of portfolio
dynamics. The only exception is the log utility case, in which uncertainty does not contribute to
explain portfolio departures from its steady state. An interesting property of the first-order dynam-
ics generated by uncertainty is that actually portfolio dynamics coincide (except for a constant)
with the sequence of steady-state portfolios that the problem would generate if we considered each
individual realization of the stochastic variance as a steady-state variance. By looking at (B.32) and
(B.36) from Appendix B you can observe that the first line of (B.36) is the time-indexed equivalent
of (B.32), adjusted by a constant.
a˜ = −ηCY DηγεY σ
2Y + ηCGDηγεGσ
2G
ηCξ(η2γεY σ
2Y + η2γεGσ
2G)
, (B.32)
aˆt =
1− σ
σηCDξ(2)(η
2
γεY σ
2Y
t+1 + η
2
γεGσ
2G
t+1)
(ηCY ηγεyσ
2Y
t+1 + ηCGηγεGσ
2G
t+1)+ (B.36)
1
ηCDξ(2)
(
1− σ
σ
ηCξa˜− ηCa ˆnfat+1 +
1
σ
(φGGˆDt ηCG + φ
AYˆ Dt ηCY ))
This means that in this specific problem comparative statics and impulse responses provide the
same piece of information, as long as only uncertainty is involved. This property implies that, in
principle, a first-order approximation of non-portfolio equations and a second-order approximation
of portfolio equations should be suﬃcient to analyze the eﬀects of uncertainty on portfolio dynamics.
The analytical solution shows that an increase in the volatility of Home endowment increases Foreign
10The simplified model describes a two-country endowment economy. Each country issues one asset and the two
economies are hit by government spending and endowment shocks.
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asset’s holdings proportionally to the product of the elasticity of consumption to endowment ηCY
and the elasticity of the return to the endowment shock ηγεY . Home endowment shocks have a
positive eﬀect on Home consumption and on Home returns. The increase in Home endowment
volatility increases the covariance between Home consumption and Home asset returns and makes
the Foreign asset a better hedging instrument against the endowment risk. Similarly, an increase in
Home government spending uncertainty modifies Home holdings of the Foreign asset proportionally
to the elasticity of government spending to consumption ηCG and the elasticity of government
spending to the Home asset return. ηγεG . For reasonable parameter values, the sign of ηCG is
negative, as the intuition would suggest. An increase in government spending crowds out private
spending. The fact that returns positively react to government spending shocks implies that their
covariance with consumption is negative: An increase in the variance of Home government spending
further reduces the covariance between consumption and Home returns. Home assets are therefore
a good hedge against government spending volatility.
1.6 Numerical Results
1.6.1 Calibration
The portfolio solution of the full model is a highly complicated expression that can only be described
numerically. The parameter values are presented in Table 1. The discount factor, β, is set equal to
0.96, in order to have a steady state real interest rate of 4%. Agents in both countries maximize the
same utility function. The constant risk aversion parameter, σ is set to 3, since empirical evidence
suggests that its value is between 2 and 3. The macro literature typically attributes to the Frisch
elasticity a value between 2 and 4, while the findings of the micro literature suggest a much lower
value for this elasticity. Consistently with the macro literature I set the parameter ϕ, equal to 0.5.
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Following Devereux and Sutherland (2008), I set the persistence parameter of the preference shock
to 0.95, while the persistence of government spending is 0.7 and the one of productivity is assumed
to be 0.9. The standard deviation of all the shocks is equal to 0.001%, and all the shocks are
i.i.d.. The share of labor income, α, equals 0.7, as suggested by empirical evidence. The home bias
parameter κ equals 0.8. The total number of bonds is normalized to 60% GDP, and the compatible
ratio of taxes over GDP is 0.046.
1.6.2 Results
In this economy there are four assets and five shocks. If we reduce the number of shocks to four,
we have locally complete markets11, i.e., it is possible to build a portfolio that is able to replicate
complete markets. Compatibly with the findings of Devereux and Sutherland (2010), the choice to
invest in both assets depends on the presence of the preference shock. In the case without preference
shock it is possible to replicate the complete asset market solution, characterized by complete home
bias in the equity portfolio. 12.
Once the preference shock is introduced, the number of assets available is smaller than the number
of shocks that hit the economy, and, therefore, agents need to hold also foreign equity in order to
achieve the highest degree of risk sharing.
Given the parameter values , the optimal portfolio implies that each country holds 20% of GDP in
11As showed in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009), when the number of shocks equals the number of assets, rank
and spanning conditions are satisfied, and one can replicate the eﬃcient risk-sharing allocation up-to the first order.
12As shown by DS (2010), this optimal portfolio is represented by zero holdings of foreign equity and a long
or short position in foreign bonds, depending on parameter values. This portfolio achieves full cross country risk
sharing and supports complete asset markets. Full risk sharing in fact requires consumption diﬀerentials adjusted for
real exchange rate movements to be equalized across countries. Bonds allow a claim on the terms of trade and the
deviation from full risk sharing across countries is proportional to the terms of trade too. Hence, a bond portfolio
can ensure full cross-country risk sharing
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foreign equity, and 4% of GDP in foreign government bonds. The steady-state portfolio is therefore
characterized by a long position in both foreign equity and foreign bond.
Figures 8, 9, and 10 show that the model matches the percentages of holdings observed in reality
fairly accurately: In 2005 foreign holdings of Treasury bonds were 5% of U.S. GDP and foreign
equity holdings were 16.6% of U.S. GDP. In 2007, foreign equity holdings were 23% of GDP and
foreign bond holdings were 4.6% of GDP. As the coeﬃcient of risk aversion increases equity home
bias increases, while the home bias in bonds is reduced. When σ = 4 agents hold an amount of
foreign equity equal to 19% of GDP, and foreign bond holdings are 5% of GDP.
In what follows, I analyze portfolio dynamics change during a crisis, when uncertainty increases in
the economy. I use the volatilities of productivity, government spending and preference shocks as a
proxy of uncertainty.
When the uncertainty shock hits the volatility of productivity, on impact Home holdings of foreign
equity increase. As the uncertainty shock hits, holdings of Foreign equity jump to 30% of GDP. As
time passes, they smoothly decrease until they go back to their steady-state (Figure 9). Foreign
bond holdings are instead strongly reduced after an increase in the volatility of the productivity
shock. When the shock hits, Home agents short-sell Foreign bonds and their foreign bond holdings
equal −2% of GDP. As variance goes back to its steady-state, foreign bond holdings go back to their
initial value of 6% of GDP (Figure 10). Home equity returns increase when Home productivity is hit
by a positive shock, while Home bond returns decrease when productivity is hit by the same shock.
This happens because a positive productivity shock reduces the price of the Home good, but, at the
same time it increases its production. This means that Home will experience an increase in total
revenue and also in dividends. On the other hand, Home bonds still pay only one unit of Home good
whose price has gone down: This results in a negative eﬀect of productivity shocks on Home bond
returns. Furthermore the elasticity of Home consumption to endowment shocks is positive. All
this implies that an increase in the volatility of Home productivity shocks increases the covariance
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between Home consumption and Home equity returns, while it reduces the covariance between
Home consumption and Home bond returns. Agents therefore use Home bonds to hedge themselves
against the high volatility in productivity shocks. They also increase their holdings of Foreign
equity whose returns are not aﬀected by Home uncertainty shocks. An increase in the volatility
of government spending shocks induces agents to increase Home equity holdings. Foreign equity
is reduced to 14% of GDP (Figure 11) and Foreign bond holdings are increased to 9.5% of GDP,
as shown in figure 12. Government spending shocks have a negative but small impact on private
consumption. Through their eﬀect on relative Home prices, they increase bond returns and reduce
equity returns. Furthermore, their eﬀect on output also increases labor income. Agents, in order
to smooth consumption, hedge the government spending risk through holdings of Foreign bonds
and Home stocks, whose returns have a negative covariance with government spending shocks.
An increase in the volatility of government spending shocks, makes these covariances even more
negative and therefore agents readjust their portfolios increasing Foreign bond holdings and Home
equity holdings. Finally an increase in the volatility of preference shocks results in an increase of
both Foreign equity and bond holdings: Foreign equity holdings reach 31% of GDP and Foreign
bond holdings reach 12% of GDP (Figure 13 and Figure 14). Preference shocks have a positive
eﬀect on consumption and on labor income. They also increase equity and bond returns. A positive
preference shock for Home good increases the world demand for that good. It has a positive eﬀect
on relative prices and relative production. As a consequence labor income, Home equity and Home
bond returns increase. An increase in the volatility of the Home preference shock increases the
positive covariance between Home consumption and Home asset returns. Agents therefore diversify
their portfolio by increasing their holdings of Foreign bonds and equity.
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1.7 Conclusion
During the financial crisis that first hit the U.S. economy and soon became a world crisis, investors
reduced their holdings of foreign equities, and, at the same time, they increased their holdings of
short-term U.S. government bonds. The paper analyzes, within the context of a DSGE model, the
hedging properties of foreign bond and foreign equity holdings during a crisis, when the degree of
uncertainty is high. Uncertainty is here described by uncertainty shocks that make the variances
of the model time-varying. Uncertainty shocks are a source of portfolio dynamics, together with
deviations of the state variables from their steady-state.
The portfolio dynamics generated by uncertainty and calculated through a combination of second
and third-order approximations of the model display a very particular property: Portfolio dynamics
are, de facto, an adjusted measure of the sequence of steady-state portfolios that would be observed
if we considered in each instant any realization of the stochastic variance as a steady-state variance.
This finding greatly simplifies the calculation of first-order portfolio dynamics.
The model is able to qualitatively replicate the change in portfolios observed during the crisis, under
certain conditions: As world government spending volatility increases, it is optimal to increase the
share of foreign bond holdings and reduce the share of foreign equity holdings. An increase in
the variance of the government spending shock increases the covariance between bond returns and
labor income and reduces the covariance between relative equity returns and labor income. Agents
therefore stabilize their total income increasing their holdings of foreign bonds and reducing the
ones of foreign equity. As world productivity volatility increases, it is optimal instead to increase
the share of foreign equity holdings and reduce the share of foreign bond holdings.
The model suggests that the movement of capital observed during the crisis is compatible with
shocks coming from the demand side of the market. These results find an important support in the
theories that have been recently developed and that identify the collapse in demand as the main
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cause of the slump experienced by the U.S. and by many other economies during the crisis.
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Appendix A
A.0.1 Steady-State Portfolio
As shown by Devereux and Sutherland (2006), a second-order approximation of the portfolio prob-
lem is suﬃcient to capture the diﬀerent features of assets and tie down a solution for steady-state
holdings of foreign assets. The symmetric non stochastic steady state of the model is used as the
approximation point for non-portfolio variables. In steady state, ¯nfaH = ¯nfaF = 0, γ¯H = γ¯F ,
Y¯ = G¯ + C¯ and β = 1γ . From the second-order approximation of the home country portfolio first
order conditions, we get:
Et[γˆ
D
t+1 +
1
2
(γˆ2H,t+1 − γˆ2F,t+1)− ρCˆH,t+1γˆDt+1] = 0 (A.1)
with γˆD = γˆHt − γˆFt .
Similarly, for the foreign country:
Et[γˆ
D
t+1 +
1
2
(γˆ2H,t+1 − γˆ2F,t+1)− ρCˆF,t+1γˆDt+1 − Qˆt+1γˆDt+1] = 0 (A.2)
Subtracting (A.2) from (A.1) , we find one of the two equations that have to hold in equilibrium:
Et[γˆ
D
t+1(CˆH,t+1 − CˆF,t+1 −
ˆQt+1
σ
)] = 0. (A.3)
26
Et(γˆ
D
t+1) = −
1
2
Et(γˆ
2
H,t+1 − γˆ2F,t+1) + ρ
1
2
Et[(CˆH,t+1 + CˆF,t+1 + Qˆt+1)γ
D
t+1] (A.4)
We can follow the same procedure for bonds too:
Et(Rˆ
D
t+1(CˆH,t+1 − CˆF,t+1)) = 0, (A.5)
Et(Rˆ
D
t+1) = −
1
2
Et(Rˆ
2
H,t+1 − Rˆ2F,t+1) + ρ
1
2
Et[(CˆH,t+1 + CˆF,t+1)Rˆ
D
t+1]. (A.6)
The optimal value of portfolio holdings can be found by solving the first order accurate behavior of
(CˆH,t+1 − CˆF,t+1), γˆDt+1, and RˆDt+1 . This requires a first-order accurate solution of the non-portfolio
equations of the model, as shown by Devereux and Sutherland (2006). The non-portfolio parts
of the model are represented by the law of motion for net foreign assets and by the first order
conditions with respect to equities and labor supply. The first-order approximation of the home
budget constraint, around a symmetric steady state with zero net foreign assets, is:
ˆnfa
H
t+1+ϕ ˆnfa
H
t+1+Cˆ
H
t = yYˆ
H
t −gGˆHt +pˆHHt −PˆHt +
1
β
ˆnfa
H
t +
aHF
βC
(γˆFt −γˆHt )+
bHF
βC
(RˆFt −RˆHt ) (A.7)
where g = GC and similarly y =
Y
C . a
HF and bHF represent the steady-state values of foreign holdings
of home shares and bonds. Taking diﬀerences between the domestic and foreign budget constraint
and using the condition ˆnfa
H
t + ˆnfa
F
t − Qˆt = 0, we get:
ˆnfa
H
t+1 =
y
2
Yˆ Dt +
1
β
ˆnfa
H
t −
1
2
CˆDt −
g
2
GˆDt + a˜γ
D
t + ˆTott + Qˆ
D
t + b˜Rˆ
D
t (A.8)
where a˜ = −aHHβC , b˜ = − b
HH
βC and Xˆ
D
t = Xˆ
H
t −XˆFt . Terms of trade, Tot are defined as pˆH− pˆF , while
the real exchange rate Q is Pˆ F − PˆH . The first-order approximations of the first order conditions
in diﬀerential terms are:
lˆDt =
1
ϕ+ α− 1(Aˆ
D
t − σCˆDt ), (A.9)
CˆDt = Et(Cˆ
D
t+1), (A.10)
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Et(γˆ
D
t+1) = 0, (A.11)
E(RˆDt+1) = 0, (A.12)
The state-space solution is characterized as follows:
ˆnfa
H
t+1 = ηaa ˆnfa
H
t + ηaADAˆ
D
t + ηaGDGˆ
D
t + ηaξ ξˆt + ηaϑϑˆt + ηavvˆt (A.13)
CˆDt = ηCDa ˆnfa
H
t + ηCDADAˆ
D
t + ηCDGDGˆ
D
t + ηCDξ ξˆt + ηCϑϑˆt + ηCDvvˆt (A.14)
where ξˆt = a˜γˆDt and ϑˆt = b˜Rˆ
D.
γˆDt = ηγDεAε
AD
t + ηγDεGε
GD
t + ηγDεvε
v
t (A.15)
RˆDt = ηRDεAε
AD
t + ηRDεGε
GD
t + ηRDεvε
v
t (A.16)
Substituting (A.13), (A.14), (A.15) and (A.16) into (A.3) and (A.5), we find the system of two
equations that have to be solved in order to find the optimal portfolio (a∗1, b
∗
1)
Et[(ηCDa ˆnfa
H
t+1 + ηCDADAˆ
D
t+1 + ηCDGDGˆ
D
t+1 + ηCDξ ξˆt+1 + ηCDϑϑˆt+1 + ηCDvvˆt+1)
(ηγDεAε
AD
t+1 + ηγDεGε
GD
t+1 + ηγDεvε
v
t+1)] = 0 (A.17)
Et[(ηCDa ˆnfa
H
t+1 + ηCDADAˆ
D
t+1 + ηCDGDGˆ
D
t+1 + ηCDξ ξˆt+1 + ηCDϑϑˆt+1 + ηCDvvˆt+1)
(ηRDεAε
AD
t+1 + ηRDεGε
GD
t+1 + ηRDεvε
v
t+1)] = 0 (A.18)
The two following equations that will determine the steady state value of bond and equity holdings:
ηCDADηγεAσ
2
A + ηCDGDηγεGσ
2
G + ηCDvηγDεvσ
2
A + ηCDξα˜(η
2
γεAσ
2
A + η
2
γεGσ
2
G + η
2
γεvσ
2
v)
+ηCϑb˜(ηγεAηRεAσ
2
A + ηγεGηRεGσ
2
G + ηγεvηRεvσ
2
v) = 0 (A.19)
ηCDADηRεAσ
2
A + ηCDGDηRεGσ
2
G + ηCDξα˜(ηγεAηRεAσ
2
A + ηγεGηRεGσ
2
G + ηγεvηRεvσ
2
v)
+ηCϑb˜(η
2
RεAσ
2
A + η
2
RεGσ
2
G + η
2
Rεvσ
2
v) = 0 (A.20)
The two equations (A.19) and (A.20) are functions of the parameters of the model and of the
variances of the shocks.
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Appendix B
In what follows I show the analytical solution for the optimal portfolio and its dynamics, when there
are uncertainty shocks. This is an infinite horizon, two-country open economy model. There are two
ex-ante symmetric countries,“Home” (H) and “Foreign” (F), each one populated by a representative
household who consumes and trades a portfolio of financial assets. There are two diﬀerent goods:
H good and F good. Final consumption is a CES aggregate of the two goods. The international
portfolio consists of two assets: Home equity and Foreign equity. I allow for two types of shocks
in each country: endowment shocks and government spending shocks. I also allow for uncertainty
shocks: The variances of both endowment and government spending shocks are indexed by time.
They stochastically move period by period according to their autoregressive processes. The number
of shocks is larger than the number of assets available: This implies that financial markets are
incomplete.
B.0.2 Preferences
The household in country i = H,F chooses consumption C i to maximize the intertemporal utility
function:
maxEt
∞￿
s=0
βs(
(C it+s)
1−σ
1− σ ) (B.1)
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with coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ > 0. The Home final consumption basket combines home
and foreign goods:
CHt = [1/2
1/θ(cHHt )
(θ−1)/θ + 1/21/θ(cFHt )
(θ−1)/θ]θ/(θ−1) (B.2)
where cij is the amount of consumption good produced by country i and consumed by country j.
The Foreign consumption basket is:
CFt = [1/2
1/θ(cFFt )
(θ−1)/θ + 1/21/θ(cHFt )
(θ−1)/θ]θ/(θ−1). (B.3)
The aggregate consumer price index for Home, PHt , is defined as:
PHt = [1/2(p
H
t )
1−θ + 1/2(pFt )
1−θ]
1
1−θ , (B.4)
where pHt and p
F
t are the nominal prices of final home and foreign goods, denominated in the Home
currency. Similarly, Foreign price index in Home currency is defined as:
P Ft = [1/2(p
F
t )
1−θ + 1/2(pHt )
1−θ]
1
1−θ . (B.5)
In this economy the law of one price holds. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) also holds, since I
assume no home bias.
B.0.3 Stochastic Processes
The endowment and government spending shocks follow an AR(1) process:
Yˆ Dt+1 = φ
Y Yˆ Dt + ε
Y D
t+1 (B.6)
GˆDt+1 = φ
GGˆDt + ε
GD
t+1 (B.7)
where Y D and GD denote the log of the productivity and the government spending shocks. Yˆ D is
the diﬀerence between the Home endowment of Home good and the Foreign endowment of Foreign
good. The innovations to the log processes (B.6) and (B.7), εY
D
t+1 and ε
GD
t+1 are identically and
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independently distributed with mean zero and variance σ2Yt+1 and σ
2G
t+1, respectively.
Furthermore, I assume that the variance of the shocks is time-varying. When an uncertainty shock
hits the economy at time t + 1, the variances of εY
D
t+1 and ε
GD
t+1 depart from their steady-state and
follow a mean reverting process:
σ2Yt+1 = ρ
Y σ2Y + (1− ρY )σ2Yt + ηY uYt+1 (B.8)
σ2Gt+1 = ρ
Gσ2G + (1− ρG)σ2Gt + ηGuGt+1 (B.9)
where uYt+1 and u
G
t+1 are identically and independently distributed process with mean zero and
unitary variance. Since ρY and ρG are smaller than 1, as time passes, the variances converge to
their steady-states σ2Y and σ2G1.
The budget constraint for the home economy at time t is:
nfaHt+1 = (Y
H
t −GHt )
pHt
PHt
− CHt + γFt nfaHt + (γFt − γHt )qHt−1SHFt (B.10)
where nfaH are net foreign assets, and they are defined as:
nfaHt+1 = q
F
t S
FH
t+1 − qHt SHFt+1 . (B.11)
Sij stands for the stock issued by country i and held by country j, while qi is the price of the stock
issued by country i. γH and γF are the returns on the stocks issued by Home and Foreign and they
are defined in terms of the consumption good:
γHt =
(PHt q
H
t + p
H
t Y
H
t )
PHt q
H
t−1
, (B.12)
and
γFt =
(PHt q
F
t + p
F
t Y
F
t )
PHt q
F
t−1
. (B.13)
1As in Benigno et al. (2010), I assume that the exogenous state variables follow conditionally-linear stochastic
processes, where the variances of the primitive shocks follow stochastic linear processes
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where the dividend paid by country’s i equity depends on the endowment of that country in that
period. Foreign agents solve a similar portfolio problem and their budget constraint is:
nfaFt+1 = (Y
F
t −GFt )
pFt
P Ft
− CFt + γHt nfaFt + (γHt − γFt )qHt−1SHFt , (B.14)
where nfaF are net foreign assets for the Foreign country, and they are defined as:
nfaFt+1 = q
H
t S
HF
t+1 − qFt SFHt+1 . (B.15)
As in Devereux and Sutherland (2006), I define the Foreign holdings of Home equity:
at = q
H
t−1S
HF
t (B.16)
B.0.4 Market Clearing Conditions
The resource constraints are
CHHt + C
HF
t +G
H
t = Y
H
t (B.17)
CFHt + C
FF
t +G
F
t = Y
F
t (B.18)
The market clearing condition for Home stocks is:
SHHt + S
HF
t = 1. (B.19)
The market clearing condition for Foreign equity is:
SFFt + S
FH
t = 1. (B.20)
B.0.5 Optimality Conditions
The first-order conditions for country i with respect to equities are:
C it
−σ
= βEt(C
i−σ
t+1γ
H
t+1), (B.21)
32
C it
−σ
= βEt(C
i−σ
t+1γ
F
t+1), (B.22)
As shown by DS (2006), a second-order approximation of the portfolio problem is suﬃcient to
capture the diﬀerent features of assets and tie down a solution for steady-state holdings of foreign
assets. The symmetric non stochastic steady state of the model is used as the approximation point
for non-portfolio variables. In steady state, nfaH = nfaF = 0, γH = γF , Y = G + C and β = 1γ .
From the second-order approximation of the home country portfolio first-order conditions, we get:
Et[γˆ
D
t+1 +
1
2
(γˆ2H,t+1 − γˆ2F,t+1)− σCˆH,t+1γˆD,t+1] = 0 (B.23)
with γˆD = γˆHt − γˆFt . Similarly, for the foreign country:
Et[γˆ
D
t+1 +
1
2
(γˆ2H,t+1 − γˆ2F,t+1)− σCˆF,t+1γˆD,t+1] = 0. (B.24)
Subtracting (B.24) from (B.23) , we find the equations that have to hold in equilibrium:
Et[γˆ
D
t+1(CˆH,t+1 − CˆF,t+1)] = 0 (B.25)
Et(γˆ
D
t+1) = −
1
2
Et(γˆ
2
H,t+1 − γˆ2F,t+1) + σ
1
2
Et[(CˆH,t+1 + CˆF,t+1)γD,t+1] (B.26)
Taking a first order approximation of Home and Foreign budget constraints and subtracting the
Foreign budget constraint from the Home one, yields the following law of motion for Home net
foreign assets:
ˆnfa
H
t+1 =
y
2
Yˆ Dt +
1
β
ˆnfa
H
t −
1
2
CˆDt −
g
2
GˆDt + a˜γ
D
t +
y − g
2
pˆD (B.27)
where
a˜ = − a
βC
(B.28)
a being the steady-state value of at as defined in (B.16). The state-space solution is characterized
as follows:
ˆnfa
H
t+1 = ˆnfa
H
t + ηaY D Yˆ
D
t + ηaGDGˆ
D
t + ηaξ ξˆt (B.29)
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CˆDt = ηCDa ˆnfa
H
t + ηCDY D Yˆ
D
t + ηCDGDGˆ
D
t + ηCDξ ξˆt (B.30)
γDt = ηγεY ε
Y D
t + ηγεGε
GD
t (B.31)
where ξˆt = a˜γˆDt . The DS solution for a˜ is:
a˜ = −ηCY DηγεY σ
2Y + ηCGDηγεGσ
2G
ηCξ(η2γεY σ
2Y + η2γεGσ
2G)
. (B.32)
B.0.6 Portfolio Dynamics
In this section I discuss the role of time-varying variances in portfolio dynamics. DS (2006) show
that a combination of third-order approximations of the portfolio equations and second-order ap-
proximations of the rest of the model delivers the path followed by the portfolio when the economy
is hit by a shock. It is first of all necessary to notice that the dynamics generated by the shocks
are diﬀerent from the ones generated by their volatility. As shown in Benigno et al. (2010), in the
presence of uncertainty shocks the second-order approximation is suﬃcient to capture the eﬀects of
uncertainty. First-order portfolio dynamics can be then generated by a combination of second and
third-order approximations of the model. The third-order approximation of the portfolio equations,
as obtained in DS (2006), is:
Et[−σCˆDt+1γˆDt+1 +
σ2
2
(CˆD(2)t+1 γˆ
D
t+1)−
σ
2
(CˆDt+1γˆ
D(2)
t+1 )] = 0, (B.33)
where CˆD(2) and γˆD(2) are the second-order approximations of consumption and return diﬀerentials.
The second-order approximation of the diﬀerential in consumption is:
CˆD(2)t = ηCDa ˆnfa
H
t + ηCDADAˆ
D
t + ηCDGDGˆ
D
t + ηCDξaγˆ
D
t +
ηCDaγD ˆnfatγˆ
D
t + ηCDAD(2)Aˆ
D(2)
t + ηCDGD(2)Gˆ
D(2)
t + ηCDξ(2) ξˆt (B.34)
where ξt is now the product between the time-varying portfolio and the first-order approximation
of the returns, aˆtγˆDt. The second-order approximation of the return diﬀerential is instead:
γˆD(2)t = ηγεAε
A
t + ηγεGε
G
t + ηγεA(2)σ
2A
t + ηγεG(2)σ
2G
t (B.35)
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Plugging (B.34) and (B.35) in (B.33) and solving for aˆt leads to the following expression:
aˆt =
(1− σ)(ηCY ηγεy [ρY σ2Y + (1− ρY )σ2Yt ] + ηCGηγεG [ρGσ2G + (1− ρG)σ2Gt ])
σηCDξ(2)(η
2
γεY [ρ
Y σ2Y + (1− ρY )σ2Yt ] + η2γεG [ρGσ2G + (1− ρG)σ2Gt ])
+ (B.36)
1
ηCDξ(2)
(
1− σ
σ
ηCξa˜− ηCa ˆnfat+1 +
1
σ
(φGGˆDt ηCG + φ
AYˆ Dt ηCY ))
The resulting expression for the portfolio dynamics aˆt shows that besides the sources of dynamics
already identified by the literature (i.e., the state variables of the model, nfa, G and A) also the
time-varying variances of the model can generate portfolio dynamics around the steady-state. An
interesting finding is that this new source of dynamics only works when the risk-aversion parameter
σ is diﬀerent from one. When agents maximize a log-utility function, time-varying volatilities do
not contribute to explain portfolio dynamics.
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B.1 Tables and Figures
Figure B.1: Nominal Exchange Rate. Source: Federal Reserve Board
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Figure B.2: Yields on 3-month Treasury Securities. Source: Federal Reserve Board
Figure B.3: Foreign holdings of U.S. assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Source: U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis
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Figure B.4: Foreign oﬃcial and private holdings of U.S. assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Source:
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure B.5: Foreign oﬃcial and private holdings of U.S.Treasuries in millions of U.S. dollars. Source:
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure B.6: U.S. holdings of foreign assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Source: U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis
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Figure B.7: U.S. holdings of short-term foreign bonds, in millions of U.S. dollars. Source: U.S.
Department of the Treasury
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Figure B.8: Foreign holdings of U.S. equities and Treasuries, as shares of U.S. GDP. Source: U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure B.9: Home holdings of Foreign equity when productivity shock volatility increases.
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Figure B.10: Home holdings of Foreign bonds when productivity shock volatility increases.
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Figure B.11: Home holdings of Foreign equity when government spending shock volatility increases.
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Figure B.12: Home holdings of Foreign bonds when government spending shock volatility increases.
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Figure B.13: Home holdings of Foreign equity when preference shock volatility increases.
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Figure B.14: Home holdings of Foreign bonds when preference shock volatility increases.
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Table B.1: Parameter Values
Parameters V alues
β 0.96
σ2A 0.01
2
σ2G 0.01
2
σ2v 0.01
2
φa 0.95
φg 0.7
φv 0.95
α 0.7
θ 1.5
σ 3
ϕ 0.5
κ 0.8
χ 1.093
Steady − State V alues
g =G/C 0.25
y=Y/C 1.25
G/Y 0.2
b=B/Y -0.6
t=T/Y 0.046
l 1
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Chapter 2
Foreign Currency Debt and Expectations
2.1 Introduction
Empirical studies 1have shown that emerging countries are often characterized by the presence of a
high share of foreign currency denominated debt. This stylized fact, often referred to as the “Orig-
inal Sin of the International Finance”, has been described as the inability of developing countries
to borrow in their own currency on the international markets. Since the “Original Sin” seems to
aﬀect also emerging countries characterized by strong fundamentals and sound policies, its main
determinants have been identified in the way international markets operate, rather than in the
specific features of each country.
As the debt crises of the 1990s show, the presence of foreign currency debt can be risky because,
beyond creating a mismatch in the domestic firms’ balance sheets, it also constraints the traditional
domestic policy instruments in dealing with home and foreign economic shocks. The reasons why
such risky forms of international finance arise in the first place remain an open question. If foreign
1Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), Eichengreen Hausmann and Panizza (2002) and Hausmann and Panizza
(2003).
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debt is so dangerous-as it is-it may be worth trying to give a micro-foundation to its emergence.
Such a high share of foreign currency debt should be at least in part justified by the presence of
some private benefits for the agents that choose this form of finance.
The goal of this paper is to rationalize the choice to borrow in dollars rather than in domestic
currency on the international markets. In order to do so, I study how informational asymmetries
and heterogeneous expectations can aﬀect the choice of a borrower to expose herself to a currency
risk. Furthermore I look at the policy implications of my findings to understand which policies
could reduce the incentive of agents to dollarize.
My model is a portfolio choice model that analyzes how agents choose in which currency they want
to borrow. In my model I have three types of agents: domestic borrowers, international investors
and a central bank in the domestic country. I analyze two diﬀerent settings of the model: In one
case I assume that domestic agents receive private signals on the economic fundamentals, while
international investors only observe a public signal that is common knowledge. The presence of
private signals generates a coordination game among domestic agents that make their choices on
the basis of their expectations and on their expectations on the expectations of the market (higher
order beliefs). In the second setting, instead, I assume that domestic agents have an informational
advantage on the international investors, but among them have access to the same piece of infor-
mation. The degree of dollarization is therefore the result of a game between two large players:
A domestic borrower and an international lender that observe diﬀerent pieces of information. The
international agent observes a public signal, while the domestic one observes the public signal plus
a “private” signal.
The main findings of my model show that when domestic agents have a high informational advan-
tage and/or there is a low level of transparency on international markets, an increase in the degree
of dollarization might be observed, if the fundamentals are relatively strong. Alternatively, if there
is endogeneity between the exchange rate policy implemented by the monetary authority and do-
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mestic agents’ decisions, a certain degree of complementarity in borrowers’ choices may arise, thus
creating a phenomenon of moral hazard. If domestic agents know that a high share of dollar debt in
the economy makes the exchange rate more rigid, they may want to coordinate on the equilibrium
where all the corporate debt in the economy is denominated in the same currency, even when the
fundamentals of the economy are relatively weak.
These results have interesting policy implications. First of all they show that the “type” of the
central bank can create moral hazard. A benevolent central bank that strongly bases her policy
on the degree of dollarization in the economy, can generate a coordination mechanism among the
domestic borrowers that results in a risky degree of dollarization. The solution would be to ex-ante
choose a central banker with a strong preference for a flexible exchange rate2.
My findings also show the importance of transparency. Transparency does not necessarily coincides
with public information. My model actually shows that the precision of private sources of infor-
mation determines the degree of dollarization. If international markets could have access to some
sources of private information, they would be more willing to lend in pesos, when the fundamentals
are relatively strong. As a consequence the economy would not experience high levels of dollariza-
tion and would be better protected against future negative shocks.
The logic of my model resembles the one used in the literature of Global Games, first introduced by
Carlsson and van Damme (1993), and then applied by Morris and Shin (1998, 1999, 2001, 2004) to
diﬀerent economic contexts, like currency crises and debt rollovers, where the complementarity of
agents’ actions plays a crucial role. Through the introduction of private information in the economy,
they show how it is possible to interpret certain phenomena as the result of higher order beliefs.
The theoretical literature on foreign currency debt in emerging economies has investigated this phe-
2Similarly to the solution proposed in the monetary literature to fight inflation bias, Rogoﬀ (1985).
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nomenon often emphasizing more its consequences than its causes3. However the positive issue of
why emerging market economies do in fact rely on foreign currency denominated debt has instead
received limited attention so far. The papers that address this issue emphasize the role of the
expectations and the interaction between domestic borrowers and the Central Bank. Chamon and
Hausman (2002), Jeanne (2003), Cowan and Do (2003) and Velasco and Chang (2004) show how
the interaction between domestic agents and their central bank can result in full dollarization of the
economy. One common problem is the diﬃculty to determine the optimal degree of dollarization
in the economy: All the mentioned papers, in fact, find either corner solutions or indeterminate
solutions. In my paper, instead, I manage to solve the indeterminacy problem. Through the intro-
duction of informational asymmetries I in fact show that the degree of dollarization is an interior
solution and is proportional to the diﬀerence in agents expectations.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3
sketches two possible settings of the game: a coordination game among the borrowers, consider-
ing the international lenders as a unique player, and a simple game between domestic borrowers
and international lenders, considered as two big players. Section 4 briefly considers some policy
implications. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Consider a single-period small open economy populated by a continuum of domestic agents dis-
tributed over the unit interval. Agents are at the same time producers and consumers. There is a
domestic currency, called peso, which is issued by the domestic Central Bank. There is also a foreign
currency, called dollar. To finance their production, at the beginning of the period the domestic
3Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001), Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2002), Gertler, Ghirchlist and Natalucci (2000),
Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2000), Faia and Monacelli (2002).
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firms borrow on the international market, here represented by a continuum of risk neutral lenders.
Each firm can borrow in pesos or dollars. As a consequence the firm’s optimal borrowing policy
determines the final degree of dollarization in the economy. The choice concerning the currency
denomination of the debt will be influenced by the diﬀerence between lenders’ and borrowers’ ex-
pectations about the future exchange rate changes. The diﬀerence in agents’ expectations comes
directly from the diﬀerent information sets they dispose of. The final exchange rate depreciation
(appreciation) will be determined by the Central Bank at the end of the period, after observing the
true state of the economy and the degree of dollarization.
2.2.1 International Investors
International lenders are risk neutral. Their opportunity cost is given by the international interest
rate i∗. The following zero-profit condition must hold for every value of m, the share of domestic
currency debt chosen by the generic domestic agent:
(1 + i) = (1 + i∗)EL (1 +∆e) (2.1)
where i is the domestic interest rate and EL (1 +∆e) is the international lender’s expectation
about the future devaluation. The supply of funds is infinitely elastic and the international banks
are willing to lend both in domestic and foreign currency to the domestic firms, if and only if the
returns given by the combination of peso and dollar debt are at least equal to the international rate
of return i∗. In other words, the Uncovered Interest Parity condition holds for the international
lenders.
2.2.2 Domestic Borrowers
Each domestic firm produces a domestic good q, and to finance its production it borrows funds on
the international markets. Domestic agents maximize a CARA utility function whose argument is
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net output, i.e. their consumption. The choice of the currency denomination of their debt results
from the maximization of their ex-ante utility function:
EiU [q − (1−mi) (1 + i∗) (1 +∆e)−mi (1 + i)]
= Ei [− exp[−A[q − (1−mi) (1 + i∗) (1 +∆e)−mi (1 + i)]]
= −Ei[exp(−A[E (q − (1−mi) (1 + i∗) (1 +∆e)−mi (1 + i) | Ii) +
−A
2
V ar (q − (1−mi) (1 + i∗) (1 +∆e)−mi (1 + i)) | Ii)]
Let
Ξi = [(Aq − A (1−mi) (1 + i∗)Ei (1 +∆e) +
−Ami (1 + i) | Ii)− 1
2
A2 (1−mi)2 (1 + i∗)2 V AR (1 +∆e) | Ii]
where A is the coeﬃcient of risk-aversion that is the same for all the domestic agents. Agent’s
optimization problem reduces to choosing the optimal share of peso-debt, mi to maximize Ξi, given
her information set Ii.
2.2.3 The Central Bank
In this economy there is a benevolent Central Bank whose policy instrument is the exchange rate.
The Central Bank chooses the exchange rate policy in order to maximize an exogenous objective
function, whose arguments are the ex-post utility function of the domestic economy (calculated by
aggregating domestic agents’ utility functions) and a term that measures the diﬀerence between
the exchange rate devaluation and an adverse shock y that hits the economy. The inclusion in the
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utility function of this term can be interpreted as the attempt of the central bank to implement an
exchange rate policy that mirrors changes in the economic fundamentals. If the economy is hit by
an adverse shock (for example to the shadow exchange rate) the Central Bank should proportionally
depreciate the exchange rate.
max
∆e
WCB = λ[
￿
(Aq − A(1−mi)(1 + i∗)(1 +∆e)− Ami(1 + i)−
1
2
A2(1−mi)2(1 + i)2V AR(∆e)Ii])di]− 1
2
[∆e− y]2 (2.2)
that becomes when we integrate over i:
max
∆e
λ[Aq − A(1−M)(1 + i)(1 +∆e)− AM(1 + i)−
1
2
A2(1−M)2(1 + i)2V AR(∆e)Ii]]− 1
2
[∆e− y]2 (2.3)
where M =
￿
midi describes the degree of domestic currency debt in the economy. From the he
first order conditions the optimal policy rule followed by the Central Bank under discretion is:
∆e = −λA (1−M) (1 + i∗) + y (2.4)
Proposition 1 The opposite biases that influence the Central Bank monetary policy when there is
the contemporaneous presence of a high level of dollarization in the economy and an adverse shock,
result in the phenomenon usually known as “Fear of Floating”.
“Fear of floating” is the expression commonly used to describe the exchange rate policy implemented
in developing countries. It has been in fact observed that these countries had a tendency to keep
their exchange rate fixed, even if they had formally adopted an flexible exchange rate regime. This
behavior introduced many distortions in the financial markets that became evident during the crises
in the late 90’s. The monetary policy rule is linear in the degree of dollarization of the domestic
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economy (1−M) and in the shock to the fundamentals. Given y, a higher share of dollar debt
creates a bias towards an appreciation of the exchange rate. On the other hand, a higher y leads to
an exchange rate devalutation. This rule shows how the exchange rate devaluation is influenced by
the degree of dollarization in the economy: a higher presence of dollar debt reduces the incentives
of the Central Bank to depreciate and instead creates a bias towards an appreciation. This justifies
the stylized fact that emerging economies adopt at least de facto fixed exchange rate regimes.
2.2.4 Equilibrium Share of Peso Debt
The optimal share of peso debt for the borrower i is given by the constrained maximization of her
ex-ante utility function, as follows:
max
m
[Aq − A(1−mi)(1 + i)(Ei(1 +∆e)|Ii)− Ami(1 + i)
−1
2
A2(1−mi)2(1 + i)2V AR(∆e)|Ii] (2.5)
s.t.
(1 + i) = (1 + i)EL(1 +∆e), (2.6)
Ei(∆e|Ii) = −λAEi[(1−M)](1 + i) + Ei(y|Ii), (2.7)
EL(∆e|IL) = −λAEi[(1−M)](1 + i) + EL(y|IL). (2.8)
The resulting optimal share of peso-debt is
mi = 1 +
(Ei(1 +∆e) | Ii)(1 + i)
AV AR(∆e | Ii)(1 + i)2 −
(EL(1 +∆e) | IL)(1 + i)
A(1 + i)2V AR(∆e | Ii) (2.9)
where (Ei(1 +∆e)|Ii) and (EL(1 +∆e)|IL) are the expectations about the exchange rate deval-
uation formulated, respectively, by the atomistic domestic borrower and the international lenders,
given their information set. Expectations are formulated on the basis of the policy rule (2.4) that is
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common knowledge in this economy. The diﬀerence in lenders’ and borrowers’ expectations is the
main reason that justifies the decision to dollarize. Assuming that i∗ = 0 the share of peso debt
can be written simply as a function of international lenders’ and the borrowers’ expectations about
∆e:
mi = 1 +
Ei(∆e | Ii)
AV AR(Ei(∆e | Ii)) −
EL(∆e | IL)
AV AR(Ei(∆e | Ii)) (2.10)
If Ei (∆e | Ii) = EL (∆e | IL) the domestic borrower chooses to borrow only in domestic currency.
This choice is the optimal one as it allows the agent to hedge herself against any shock to the
exchange rate. The main reason that justifies the choice to borrow in dollars is that the expectations
about the stability of the exchange rate are diﬀerent for the international lenders and the borrowers
with Ei (∆e) < EL (∆e) . In that case the share of peso debt mi is less than 1. There is a continuum
of equilibria that crucially depend on the inequality between Ei(∆e|Ii) and EL(∆e|IL).
2.3 The Game
It has been shown that the optimal share of peso debt (2.9) depends upon the diﬀerence between
lenders’ and borrowers’ expectations about the devaluation of the exchange rate. The choice to
borrow in foreign currency can signal a diﬀerence in the information available to the two sets
of agents considered. If lenders expect a higher depreciation rate than borrowers, the domestic
interest rate will increase making the decision to borrow in pesos more expensive. As a consequence,
domestic agents will have to compare the currency risk associated with dollar debt and the cost
of borrowing in domestic currency, given lenders’ pessimism, and choose accordingly. The policy
rule (2.4) followed by the Central Bank shows that agents’ strategies are characterized by a certain
degree of complementarity: The higher the share of dollar debt in the economy is, the higher the
bias of the Central Bank to fix or appreciate the exchange rate. The degree of dollarization in the
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domestic economy is described as the result of a coordination game. Two settings of the game are
analyzed:
• A coordination game among a continuum of atomistic domestic agents that have to choose
the optimal share of peso debt, given the presence of an international investor, represented
by the international market as a whole.
• A game between two large players, a domestic borrower and an international investor.
2.3.1 The Coordination Game among the Domestic Borrowers
Domestic and international agents at time 0 have a common prior about the adverse shock (y) that
hits the economy. The shock is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2y . At time 1 the
shock is realized, but it is not directly observed. At time 2 domestic borrowers receive a private
signal xi = y + ￿i that describes the shock and that they use to update their prior. The error
term ￿i is normally distributed over the population of borrowers with mean 0 and finite variance
￿i ∼ N (0, σ2￿ ). At time 3 Borrowers and lenders formulate their expectations on ∆e and M , and
the final share of peso debt in the economy is determined. The last stage of the game takes place
when the Central Bank, after observing the actual values of M and y chooses how to move the
exchange rate. The borrowers follow the policy rule (4) to update their expectations on ∆e, as
follows:
Ei(∆e | xi,µ) = −λAEi[(1−M) | xi,µ](1 + i∗) + Ei(y | xi,µ) (2.11)
The updated expectation of y after observing the private signal is:
Ei(y | xi,µ) = σ
2
￿
σ2￿ + σ
2
y
µ+
σ2y
σ2￿ + σ
2
y
xi. (2.12)
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The precisions of the two signals are α =
1
σ2y
and β =
1
σ2￿
, and the updated expectation of y
can be written as:
Ei(y | xi,µ) = αµ+ βxi
α + β
. (2.13)
The conditional expectation of the exchange rate devaluation is:
Ei ( ∆e | xi,µ) = −λA (Ei (1−M) | xi,µ) + Ei(y | xi,µ) = −λA+ λAEi (M) +
+
αµ+ βxi
α + β
.
Plugging the expression for Ei ( ∆e | xi,µ) into (10), mi becomes:
mi = 1− EL (∆e | µ) + λA
AV AR (∆e)
+
λAEi (M | xi,µ) + Ei (y | xi, µ)
AV AR (∆e)
. (2.14)
It depends on borrower’s expectations on the fundamentals and on the total share of peso debt in
the economy, and on lenders’ expectations on the future devaluation rate. Each agent cares not
only about her own beliefs on the state of the economy, but also about other agents’ beliefs. To find
the equilibrium value of mi I use the method of the undetermined coeﬃcients. To find Ei (M | xi,µ)
I guess the generic rule followed by the domestic borrower j in the economy. The strategy followed
by the generic agent j depends on both the public (i.e. the common prior) and the private signals
she observes, plus a constant.
mj = Kxxj +Kµµ+ γ (2.15)
The total share of peso debt in the economy is found by integrating the individual share over
the continuum of domestic agents as follows:
M = Kxy +Kµµ+ γ (2.16)
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And finally the expectation of the domestic agent i under study is formulated in the following
way:
Ei (M | xi, µ) = Ei (Kxy +Kµµ+ γ) = Kx
￿
αµ+ βxi
α + β
￿
+Kµµ+ γ (2.17)
After finding agent i ’s expectation on the strategy followed by the rest of the market, I use the
optimal rule (2.4) to get the equilibrium share of peso debt for each domestic agent:
mi = 1− [EL (∆e | µ) + λA] (α + β)− λA (α + β) γ
AV AR (∆e) (α + β)
+
+
λAKxα + λAKµ (α + β) + α
AV AR (∆e) (α + β)
µ+
λAKxβ + β
AV AR (∆e) (α + β)
xi
The expression for mi now depends only on the public and the private signals, and on lenders’
expectations about the exchange rate devaluation EL (∆e | µ). International lenders formulate
their expectations only on the basis of the common prior on y. The expression for EL (∆e | µ) is as
follows:
EL (∆e | µ) = −λA+ λAEL (M | µ) + EL (y | µ) (2.18)
Since M = Kxy + Kµµ + γ is a function of parameters that are common knowledge in the
economy, lenders’ expectations are defined as:
EL (M | µ) = (Kx +Kµ)µ+ γ. (2.19)
EL (∆e | µ) can then be expressed as follows:
EL (∆e | µ) = −λA+ λA [(Kx +Kµ)µ+ γ] + EL (y | µ) . (2.20)
The expression for mi becomes:
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mi = 1− λAKxβ + β
AV AR (∆e | xi,µ) (α + β)µ+
λAKxβ + β
AV AR (∆e | xi,µ) (α + β)xi. (2.21)
Equating the coeﬃcients that appear in the guess and those that characterize the optimal share
of peso debt, the final expression for the individual optimal share of peso debt becomes:
mi =
β
A[V AR(∆e | xi,µ)(α + β)− λβ] (xi − µ) + 1. (2.22)
Finally the conditional variance of the exchange rate is:
V ar(∆e | xi, µ) = (λAKx + 1)
2
α + β
. (2.23)
Under the condition that α ￿= −β,the only acceptable solution is
V ar(∆e | xiµ) = 1
2(α + β)
[(1 + 2λβ) +
￿
4βλ+ 1]. (2.24)
Substituting the value of V AR(∆e | xi, µ) into the expression for mi , the optimal share of peso
debt chosen by the domestic agent i depends exclusively on the precision of the private signal, on
the coeﬃcient of risk aversion A, on the parameter λ that characterizes the policy rule and on the
value of the two signals:
mi =
β
A
￿
1
2
￿
(1 + 2λβ) +
√
4βλ+ 1
￿− λβ￿ (xi − µ) + 1. (2.25)
The share of peso debt depends on the diﬀerence between the private and the public signal and
on the precision of the former. A highly precise private signal describing pretty strong fundamentals
induces the agent who observes it to choose dollar debt that seems relatively cheaper and not too
risky.
It is worth noting that the precision of the public signal does not enter the expression for the
equilibrium share of peso debt. This result is quite diﬀerent from the ones usually found in global
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game models where the coordination motive results in a weight given to the public signal that is
increasing in its precision. Here instead there is a positive term in β involving the private signal and
a corresponding negative term involving the public signal. The share of peso debt overreacts to the
private signal, while the information content of the public signal is suppressed. This seems to confirm
the intuition that the choice concerning the currency denomination of the debt mainly depends on
the diﬀerences in the availability of information. Within the context of an ordinary coordination
game the public signal influences the final outcome not only because of the information it conveys,
but also because of its ability to re-create a certain degree of common knowledge among agents.
The role of public information becomes here secondary instead, because it is contemporaneously
used by two diﬀerent categories of agents.
The currency denomination of the debt can be interpreted as a signal of strong fundamentals that
domestic agents send to the international markets. The ability to send such a signal comes directly
from the informational advantage they have with respect to international agents. The signal is
stronger when the private information is more precise. By integrating mi over the continuum of
domestic borrowers, the optimal share of peso debt M is :
M =
2
A
￿
1 +
√
4βλ+ 1
￿ [β (y − µ)] + 1 (2.26)
The optimal share of peso debt in the economy resulting from the coordination game among the
domestic borrowers depends on the spread between the actual value of the fundamentals and their
common prior and on the parameters describing the precision of the private signal, the risk aversion
and the weight given to the social utility in the objective function of the Central Bank. When the
realization of the shock equals its prior all agents’ expectations are the same and the share of dollar
debt in the economy is zero (M = 1).
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Comparative Statics
It is possible to infer the following propositions from equation (2.26) :
Proposition 2 When the fundamentals are strong, i.e. y < µ, an increase in the precision of the
private signal observed by agents results in an increase of the degree of dollarization in the economy.
The partial derivative of M with respect to β is:
∂M
∂β
=
(y − µ)
A
￿
1 +
√
4βλ+ 1
￿2 ￿√4βλ+ 1 + 2λβ + 1￿√4βλ+ 1
If the precision of the private source of information available to the domestic borrowers increases,
we observe an increase in the degree of dollarization. If the fundamentals are strong in fact it is
less risky in the borrowers’ eyes to borrow in foreign currency and, as a result, the average share of
peso debt decreases. On the other hand, if the realization of the shock y is higher than its prior, an
increase in β increases the degree of peso debt in the economy. In other terms, a high precision of
the private signal leads the currency denomination choices in the direction that is more consistent
with the actual state of the economy.
Proposition 3 When the fundamentals are weak, i.e. y > µ, an increase in the parameter λ
increases the degree of dollarization in the economy.
The partial derivative of M with respect to λ is:
∂M
∂λ
= − 4β
2 (y − µ)
A
￿
1 +
√
4βλ+ 1
￿2 1√4βλ+ 1
In correspondence of relatively weaker conditions of the fundamentals (y > µ), a higher protection
of the Central Bank towards those that borrow in dollars increases the degree of dollarization. Even
though the fundamentals are not very strong, the stronger commitment of the monetary authority
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to keep the exchange rate appreciated increases the degree of dollarization observed. Agents expose
themselves to a risk that otherwise they would not have run. This is what I define “dollarization
due to moral hazard”.
2.3.2 Simple Game between Two Large Players
The optimal share of peso debt for the atomistic domestic borrower is given as before by (2.10) . In
order to analyze other factors that influence the degree of dollarization in the economy, I will slightly
change the set-up of the game and show how things go under diﬀerent assumptions. Both domestic
and international investors have a common prior about the shock, that is normally distributed
with finite mean and variance: y ∼ N ￿µ, σ2y￿ . In order to emphasize the supply side factors that
can be involved in the process of dollarization leaving aside the informational asymmetries among
domestic agents, I assume in this new version of the game that after the shock takes place, all
the domestic borrowers observe the same private signal about the fundamentals xi = y + ￿i,where
￿i = ￿j with ￿ ∼ N (0, σ2￿ ). In this case the signal is private in the sense that it can be observed
only by the domestic agents and not by the international markets. The direct consequence of this
assumption is that all the borrowers choose the same composition of debt, observing exactly the
same information. In this case the problem of Higher Order Beliefs is not taken into consideration
anymore, and mi = m = M . International investors do not precisely see the average share of peso
debt in the economy. They observe a public signal z, instead. The degree of dollarization in the
economy is given by the combination of borrowers’ and lenders’ expectation about the movements
in the exchange rate. The Central Bank in the last stage observes M and y and implements the
optimal monetary policy, as before. Since all the borrowers observe the same “private” signal x I
will not use the subscript i. The share peso debt of the single borrower coincides with the degree
of domestic currency debt in the economy. Equation (2.10) becomes:
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M = 1 +
E (∆e | x, µ)
AV AR (∆e | x, µ) −
EL (∆e | z, µ)
AV AR (∆e | x, µ) . (2.27)
Employing the policy rule (4), it is possible to see that the expectations about the movements
in the exchange rate formulated by the domestic market are as follows:
E(∆e | x, µ) = −λA+ λAM + E(y | x, µ) (2.28)
The variance of the depreciation rate coincides now with the variance of the shock:
V ar(∆e | x, µ) = σ
2
yσ
2
￿
σ2y + σ
2
￿
(2.29)
If we call α =
1
σ2y
and β =
1
σ2￿
V ar(∆e | xµ) = 1
α + β
. (2.30)
The international borrowers observe a public signal describing the share of peso debt in the
economy z = M + η where η ∼ N(0, σ2η). Their expectations are still formulated on the basis of
the optimal policy rule (4) as follows:
EL(∆e | µ, z) = −λA+ λAM + λAη + µ. (2.31)
Plugging the expectations into (2.27) , the final expression for the total share of peso debt is a
function of the precision of the public and the private signals, the two signals themselves, the noise
of the signal observed by the lenders and the parameter λ that appears in the utility function of
the Central Bank.
M = 1 +
(α + β)
A
(
β(x− µ)
α + β
− λAη). (2.32)
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The total share of domestic currency denominated debt in the economy is lower when the private
signal observed within the domestic economy is lower than the common prior shared by all the
agents, and gives rise to more optimistic expectations about the state of the fundamentals. Another
important element is the noise η. If the low level of transparency on the international markets
induces the lenders to overestimate the share of peso debt in the economy, the expectations of
devaluations of the lenders will be higher and therefore the supply of domestic currency denominated
funds will be lower.
Comparative Statics
From equation (2.32) it is possible to infer the following propositions:
Proposition 4 An increase in the size of the noise that aﬀects the signal z observed by the inter-
national lenders reduces the share of peso debt.
∂M
∂η
= −λ (α + β)
A low level of transparency on the international markets increases the level of dollarization.
If international lenders overstate the share of peso debt in the economy, they will increase their
devaluation expectations and with them also the price of domestic currency denominated funds.
Such an increase in the share of dollar debt is greater in correspondence of high values of λ and
highly precise signals about the fundamentals.
Proposition 5 An increase in the value of the parameter λ reduces the share of peso debt.
∂M
∂λ
= −η (α + β)
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An increase in the parameter that weights the social welfare in the utility function of the Central
Bank results in an increase in the degree of dollarization, when the low level of transparency
on the international markets induces the lenders to overestimate the share of peso debt in the
domestic economy. A paternalist central bank increases agents’ incentives to contract dollar debt.
If international investors overestimate the presence of domestic currency denominated debt (η > 0),
it will become more expensive to borrow in pesos and the degree of dollarization will increase.
Proposition 6 An increase in the precision β of the private signal that domestic agents observe,
decreases the share of peso debt, when international investors overestimate the degree of dollariza-
tion. This eﬀect is even stronger when the domestic market has optimistic expectations about the
fundamentals.
∂M
∂β
=
(x− µ)
A
− λη
A higher precision of the private signal that the domestic economy observes increases the level
of dollarization, when the fundamentals described by the private signal are stronger than the ones
implied by the public signal. The degree of dollarization is also influenced by the policy parameter
λ and by the degree of transparency on the international markets. If international investors over-
estimate the share of peso debt in the economy (η > 0), their expectations of devaluation will be
high and the supply of domestic currency denominated debt will be reduced.
Proposition 7 An increase in the precision of the public signal increases the degree of dollarization,
when the international markets overestimate the presence of peso debt in the economy.
∂M
∂α
= −λη
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An increase in the precision of the public signal increases the degree of dollarization, when
international markets have high expectations of devaluation. In this case the value of the two
signals doesn’t appear, while only λ and η influence the degree of dollarization.
2.4 Policy Implications
The simple exercise of comparative statics conducted in both the frameworks analyzed gives rise to
very similar results. Even if the expression of the average peso debt in the economy M comes from
diﬀerent contexts, its reaction to a marginal increase of some key parameters like λ (the weight
of the social utility in the objective function of the Central Bank), and β (the precision of the
private signal observed only by the domestic borrowers), goes in the same direction. An increase in
λ produces the same eﬀect of a decrease in the borrowers’ risk aversion. If there is an increase in
the weight given to the social utility in the objective function of the Central Bank, people are more
willing to borrow in dollars because they know the central bank will protect them, avoiding any
depreciation of the exchange rate. This creates a moral hazard problem in the domestic economy
because agents will be willing to borrow in foreign currency even when the economy is relatively
weak.
An increase in the precision of the private signal about the fundamentals, β, lowers the peso debt in
the economy, when the fundamentals are relatively strong. It is in fact reasonable to think that if
the precision of the private signal increases, the weight given by domestic borrowers to the private
information increases as well, and the choice to borrow in dollars ends up revealing this additional
information they dispose of.
Another important parameter able to influence the degree of dollarization is the size of the error
term η. A marginal increase in η results always in an increase in the share of dollar debt, and
the presence of this parameter in the other partial derivatives always makes the increase in the
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degree of dollarization stronger. Higher transparency on international markets about the true level
of dollarization would, in some cases, help reduce the share of dollar debt, in economies already
characterized by a high level of dollarization.
It would be interesting to analyze the eﬀect on M produced by an increase in the sources of
information available on the international markets. The presence of private information on the
international markets could reduce the necessity of the domestic economy to borrow in dollars.
This would happen because international investors, having access to pieces of information that are
not public, could be more willing to lend in pesos. This would reduce the degree of dollarization even
when the fundamentals are relatively strong and would protect the economy from future negative
shocks.
2.5 Conclusion
The paper analyzes the factors that determine the high share of foreign currency debt that we ob-
serve in many emerging markets, even if characterized by strong fundamentals and sound policies.
Through a simple model I show how the combination of demand and supply side factors can explain
the emergence of the phenomenon known as ”Original Sin”. The main result is that the diﬀerent
information sets available to the agents in the economy can justify the formation of diﬀerent expec-
tations about the soundness of the domestic market and,therefore, the choice to dollarize. The most
important factors that help explain the share of dollar debt in the economy are the informational
advantage about the state of the economy that domestic agents have over international markets,
the exchange rate policy and the degree of transparency on the international markets. The relative
incidence of supply and demand side factors on the determination of the final degree of dollariza-
tion in the economy can change depending on the time and on the markets considered. In general
the message of the model is that a high dollar debt even in strong economies, can be due to a
70
willingness of such countries to signal their good shape on the one hand, and to the low ability of
the international markets to catch this signal on the other. It is worth noting that a crucial role is
played by the Central Bank that with its exchange rate policy can deeply influence agents’ behavior
and, eventually, create dangerous distortions in the economy.
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Appendix C
In order to analyze whether the optimal share of peso debt chosen by each agent in the economy
depends on the nature of the information available (public or private), I slightly modify some
assumptions on the signals observed by the agents in the economy. If a certain degree of public
information is shared only by domestic agents, the usual result concerning the typical over-reaction
to public information is reestablished, even though the private information goes on playing a crucial
role. This exercise helps clarify the main intuition according to which the problem analyzed in the
model displays important complementarities in domestic agents’ actions.
There is a common prior about the adverse shock that will hit the domestic market shared by
the whole economy. The shock y is normally distributed with mean φ and precision θ, y ∼ N ￿φ, 1θ￿.
After the shock has taken place, domestic agents update their expectations by observing a public
signal µ, such that µ = y + η, with η ∼ N ￿0, 1α￿ and a private signal xi , such that xi = y + ￿i,
with ￿iiid ∼ N
￿
0, 1β
￿
and ￿i ￿= ￿j.The diﬀerence in the availability of information is now given by
the presence of a public and a private signal that only domestic agents can observe.
Moving from equation (2.10) that describes the optimal share of peso debt chosen, the guess
concerning the generic domestic agent j’s actions depends now on the prior, the public signal and
the private signal:
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mj = kxxj + kφφ+ kµµ+ γ (C.1)
The total amount of peso debt can be found by integrating over the continuum of domestic
agents
M = kxy + kφφ+ kµµ+ γ (C.2)
Ei (M | φ, µ, xi) = kxEi (y | φ, µ, xi) + kφφ+ kµµ+ γ (C.3)
International investors’ expectations about the exchange rate devaluation depend, as before,
only on the common prior
EL (∆e | φ) = −λA+ λAEL (M | φ) + EL (y | φ) (C.4)
EL (M | φ) = (kx + kφ + kµ)φ+ γ (C.5)
EL (∆e | φ) = −λA+ λA ((kx + kφ + kµ)φ+ γ) + φ (C.6)
Plugging (C.3) and (C.6) into (2.10) I get
mi = 1 +
−λA ((kx (α + β) + kµ (ϑ+ α + β))φ)− φ (α + β)
AV AR (∆e) (ϑ+ α + β)
+
λA [kxαµ+ kµµ (ϑ+ α + β)] + αµ
AV AR (∆e) (ϑ+ α + β)
+
λAkxβxi + βxi
AV AR (∆e) (ϑ+ α + β)
(C.7)
The average degree of domestic currency denominated debt in the economy becomes:
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M = 1 +
2β
A
￿
(1 + 2λβ) +
√
1 + 4βλ
￿ (y − φ)+ (C.8)
+
α
A
￿
(1 + 2λβ) +
√
1 + 4βλ
￿ (µ− φ)+
+
α
￿
2λβ +
√
1 + 4βλ
￿
A
￿
(1 + 2λβ) +
√
1 + 4βλ
￿µ− α (2λ+ 1)
A
￿
(1 + 2λβ) +
√
1 + 4βλ
￿φ
The introduction of a public signal µ observable only by the domestic borrowers reestablishes,
to a certain extent, the usual properties of the public information in the context of a coordination
game. The final degree of peso debt in the economy depends (positively) on the public signal and on
the realized value of the shock , while it depends negatively on the common prior. More precisely,
the degree of peso debt depends on the diﬀerence between the actual realization of the shock and
its prior (as before) and now-with the introduction of a public signal-also on the diﬀerence between
the public signal itself and the common prior, weighted by the precision of the former. From the
first two elements of (C.8) we can infer that the share of peso debt “over-reacts” to the actual
realization of the shock and to the public signal, while the information content of the common prior
is to some extent suppressed. In other terms, the final degree of dollarization depends crucially on
the additional information domestic agents dispose of. The public signal enters the expression for
M with a higher weight, but still the private signal matters for the final degree of peso debt. This
finding is due to the presence of actions that are at the same time substitutes and complements.
Since the game takes place on two levels, as a coordination game within the domestic economy
and as a game between the domestic agents and the international markets, this result combines the
diﬀerent natures of agents’ actions.
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Appendix D
It has been shown that the monetary policy crucially influences agents’ borrowing decision. A large
value of λ in the policy function means that agents’ utility enters the welfare function with a high
weight. A higher degree of “paternalism” of the monetary authority seems to increase the incentive
of domestic agents to borrow in foreign currency. That is to say, we observe a phenomenon of moral
hazard due to the strong protection from exchange rate depreciations given by the central bank to
those that dollarize. In the paper I analyzed the role of monetary policy under discretion, but it is
worth studying how things change under commitment. Under a credible commitment the monetary
authority that wants to rule out any coordination motive among agents and reduce as much as
possible the moral hazard, announces an exchange rate rule that does not depend on the average
degree of dollarization in the economy. I assume that the central bank credibly commits to a rule
such that the movements in the exchange rate are only justified by the occurrence of supply shocks
denoted as before by y.
∆e = γ (y) (D.1)
The optimal share of domestic currency denominated debt, mi depends now on the expectations
formulated on the basis of the new rule (D.1) . Foreign investors formulate their expectations on
the basis of their information set given simply by the common prior on y, while domestic agents use
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both the sources of information they have, given by the prior and the private signal they observe.
Equation (2.10) now becomes
mi = 1 +
γ
￿
αµ+ βxi
α + β
￿
− γµ
AV AR (∆e | xi,µ)
The conditional variance of ∆e is
V AR (∆e | xi,µ) = γ
2
α + β
mi = 1 +
β (xi − µ)
Aγ
(D.2)
The total share of peso debt in the economy therefore is
M = 1 +
β (y − µ)
Aγ
(D.3)
In order to find the optimal degree of dollarization under commitment it is necessary to maximize
the social welfare function with respect to γ :
max
γ
WCCB = λ[Aq − A(1−M)(1 + i∗)(1 +∆e)− AM(1 + i)
−1
2
A2(1−M)2V AR(∆e)]− 1
2
[∆e− y]2 (D.4)
max
γ
λ[Aq +
β(y − µ)
γ
￿
1 + γy)− A[1 + β(y − µ)
Aγ
](1 + γµ
￿
−
1
2
A2(
β(y − µ)
Aγ
)2
γ2
α + β
]− 1
2
[γy − y]2 (D.5)
The optimal value of γ is:
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γ =
y2 − µAλ
y2
(D.6)
It is now possible to compare the optimal share of peso debt in the economy under commitment
(M c) with the one that emerges under discretion (Md) :
M c = 1 +
β (y − µ) y2
A (y2 − µAλ) (D.7)
Md =
2
A
￿
1 +
√
4βλ+ 1
￿ [β (y − µ)] + 1 (D.8)
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